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NOTES O N T H E STATUS OF
MENTAL DISABIL ITY CASES UN DER
GEORGIA 'S WORKERS' COM PENSATION ACT
L) nda \\ . Skelton

Traditionally, workers' compensation laws allowed an injured employee 10 recover when he had suffered an injury by accident. This injury
was defined as a disability broutht on by physical trauma occuring on the
job and arising out of the employment. Questions arose to clarify the definition o f " injury by accident." Did the injury have to occur suddenly or
could it be a gradual thing occurring over a long period of time? Did the injury have to result from a physical blow to the body or would a physical
blow to the nervous system suffice? Could a purely psychological disability
rather than a physical disability be compensable under the injury by accident doctrine? Larson notes that the law has traditionally insisted upon
some physical basis in the compensable disability. Howe\'er, in the last two
decades a category of compensable injuries has arisen involving a mental or
emotional stimulus resulting in a psychological injury. Larson describes an
already visible majority position supporting compensabili ty in these cases.'
Federal awards came in the mid-1960',. In American National Red
Cross v. Hagen, 327 P.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1964), the claimant's acute schizophrenia reaction, paranoid type, wa, found to be causally rdated to the
Stresses of his Red Cross worker', job and wa, held compensable. In Bwler
v. Distric1 Parking .Wanagement Company, 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
the Court allowed compensation ~here the claimant had a schizophrenic
reaction after 20 years as a parking lot attendant.'
Since 1960 various \!ates have allo\\ed compensation for emotional
disability which aro\e from emotional trauma on the job. absent physical
impetus. The first major ca\e of this type \~a\ Carter v. General .\,/otors
Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W. 2d 105 (1960). The claimant. anxious that
he would not be able to keep up with the assembly line in the car manu facturing plant where he worked, suffered a psychosis which resulted in mental
disability. The Michigan Court awarded Carter wmpensation for hb loss of
earning capacity becau~e of his paranoid schizophrenia ari~ing out of anJ in
the course of hi~ employment.• The Court found that the p~ychosis Jid not
result from a single chance happening nor \\ as there a direct pbysical blO\\
to the plaintiff\ body. In fact, the plaintiff in thb ca5e already had a persona lity predisrosition toward the development of psychosis. According to
testimony at the hearing, Carter felt himself trapped in an impossible ~ituation where he could not keep up
ith assembly line requiremcnb.
Therefore, the court found his disability was cau~ed by neither physical injury nor sudden psycbological trauma such as fright or ~hm:k but by daily
emotiona l pressure of the job.
The Carter Court found that the employment pre~sure wa~ not
unusual, but one whic h a ll other members of the assembly line group suffered as well as Carter. H owever after initially determining that this clai-
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mant's mental disability wa5 work-connected, the Court allowed compensation where the purpose of the statute "as to provide compensation for incapacity to earn and not for the injury as such. The Michigan Court ruled
that so long as the mental disability was a personal disability due to causes
and conditions characteristic of and peculiar tc the business of his
employer, emotional disability could then be either an injury or an occupational disease. Either way, Carter's emotional disability was compensable
under the act because it was work-connected.
California followed Michigan in the early 1970s in holding that no
physical accident or trauma is necessary a~ a precondition to recovery For
psychoneurotic injury ~o long a, a proper industrial causation is proven. See
e.g., Baker v. Workman Compensation Appeal Board, 18 Cal. App. 3rd
852, 36 Cal. Compensation 431, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279 ( 1971 ). A Kentucky court
affirmed a compensation award to an employee who suffered a nervom
breakaown while working on a production job for a clothing manufacturer.
The Court rejected the argument that there mu~t be some physical trauma
associated with the disability. Yocom v. Pierce, 534 S. W. 2d 796 (Ky. 1976).
Wisconsin agreed that the psychological injury or disability could be compensable where cau~ed by the emotional strain from the job, e,en though no
physical injury resulted. However in Swiss Colony v. Department of ILHR,
72 Wi,. 2d, 46,240 N.W. 2d 128 (1976), the Court held that in order fora
non-traumatically caused injury to be compensable the injury must have
re~ulted from a situation of greater dimen~ion than the day to day mental
stresses and tensions which all employees mu~t experience.
A number of states qill deny compensation in the mental stimulas to
mental disability category.• Georgia apparently is one of these states.' What
then is the case for compensation for emotional disability in Georgia?
Georgia law allowing compen5ation for emotional disability is
predicated on Indemnity Insurance Company of f',:orrh America v. Loftis,
103 Ga. App. 749, 120 S.E. 2d 655 (1961). The claimant in Loftis had suffered an accidentai injury on the job which resulted first in a physical
di5abilitv, later in a neurosis. Judge Carlisle, writing for the Court, cited
with approval the following statement of a director of the State Board of
Worker\' Compensation:
The human body consists of bones, flesh, ligaments and
nerves controlled by the brain. The law does not state
which ~f the particular elements must produce the disability. If a disabili1y exists, whether or not it is psychic or mental if it is real and is brought on by the accident and injur'y, thi s being a humane ta"' and liberally construed, it is
nevertheless compensable.
The Court found the ciaiman1's neurosis cau5ed by physical accident to
be compensable, and thus established a precedent for recovery for a limited
category of emotional disabili1ies.
.
.
The Georgia requirement that a disability be caused by accident~! injury was tested again. Seven years later, the Court had an opportumty to
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consider whether a specific emotional upset on the job could suffice as "!njury by accident." In Bral(V v. Royai M~nufacruring Company,. 117 Ga.
App. 312, 160 S.E. 2d 424 (1968), the claimant 50ught compensation for a
conversion reaction in which she supposed her a, m to be paralyzed. The
reaction resulted from an emotionally upsetting discussion with her
employer. The Court denied recovery, although it ditl find_ tha_t _the claimant
suffered some type of mental illne,~. The emotional d1sab1hty stemmed
from excitement and upset, not from an accidental physical injury. Abst:nt
a physical injury by accident, there could be no recovery for emotional
disability, even though such disability was unquestionably work-related.
Judge Felton dissented in Brady on the grounds tha1 the Court too narrowly defined the world "accident'. He pointed out that where the triggering stimulus was not planned, its occurrence \\a5 accidental. Thu5 the
disability that follo\\ed wa, a result of accident. The conversion reaction
paralysis in Brady should be treated a~ the neurosis in Loftis v. here compensation for emotional disabilit~ !lowed from injury by accident according to
the dissenl. The Brady claimant suffered injury to her mental health by an
accidental on the job occurrence and should be compensated. HO\\ ever, this
11as not the majority view and therefore Brady stands for the proposition
1hat recovery for emotional disability must be ba,ed on inJury by physical
accident.
Another category of emotional disability cast:s emerged with Ciry
Council of Augusta v. If illram5, 137 Ga. App. 177, .223 S. E. 2d 227 (1976).
This claimant suffered an acute myocardial infarction brought on at least in
part by severe emotional stre,, related to his job. The Court noted that a
heart attack wa\ not compensable under the personal injury requirement in
Georgia law unle\~ the allad, "was attributable to the performance of the
usual work of employment." Williamf, id. at 178 223 S.E. 2d at 228. The
question remained as to whether or not severe emotional stre,s that ,\as
work-connected would be sufficient to met·t the tc~t of "inJury by
acciden1."TheCourtcitedJewe//, Inc. v. Peck, 116Ga. App. 405,157 S.E.
2d 806 (1967) (where working long hours resulted in a heart attack), a,
authority for the propo~ition that abnormal strain on the job rather than
some _~pecific incident of physical exertion at work could satisfy the
causative test of "mjury by accident." Thus, rea~oned the Court, emotional
strain could initiate a heart attack without defeat mg the claimant\
recovery. As a result of Wi/1,a,ns, Georgia allowed phvsical di~abilitie,
caused by emotional strain to meet the te,t of injury by ~ccident.
The Georgia Workers' Compensation Cotle \\a, amended in 1971 to
allow
·
·
b y accident,
·
. , 1·n a dd'111011
to ·lllJury
recovery from occupational
disease. _Ga. Code Ann. § I 14-803, which had prt:viously li\tt:d only spt:cific
occupat1onal diseases which were compensable a\ accidental injuries ,~'t\
ex~anded to include unscheduled occupational diseases. Sub,ection (.5) r~quircd that such unscheduled diseases meet five condition~ to be rnmpcnsable:

1

(A)

A direct causal connection between the conditions
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under which the work is performed and the disease·
That the disease followed as a natural incident of ex~
posure by rea~on of the employement;
(C} That the disease is not of a character to which the
employee may have had substantial exposure outside
of the employment;
(D) That the disease is not an ordinary disease of life to
which the general public is exposed; [and]
(E) That the disease mu,t aprear to have had its origin in
a risk connected with the employment and to have
flowed from that ~ource a~ a natural consequence.
(B)

The add it ion of Code Ann. § I 14-803(5) meant that a disabled claimant
nO\~ had two grounds on which to base recovery: (I) injury by accident or
(2) unscheduled occupational disea~e.'
The first case of mental disability to be considered under the occupational disease category was Sai,:ver v. Pacific Indemnity Company, 141 Ga.
App. 298, 233 S. E. 2d 227 (1977). The claimant's disability was paranoid
schizophrenia. The disease manifested itself in a mental breakdown after
the claimant had been working for two years as counselor to a group of
emotionally disturbed boys at Annewakee Foundacion. The breakdown occurred three days after the claimant had abruptly resigned his position. The
Court noted that the manifestation of the disability occurred after the
employer-employee relationship ended, but that the di,abling psychosis was
developing prior to his resignation and was job-related. The decision of the
three-member panel, wrillen by Presiding Judge Deen, reviewed the award
denying compe nsation and directed that the case be sent to the Workers'
Compensation Medical Board for consideration of the psychosis under the
condition~ of Code Ann . §I 14-803(5). Therefore Sawyer provides no
holding whether or not mental di~ability related to pressures of the job is
compensable a~ an occupational disease.
Sawyer, however, does contain interesting dicta concerning the
Georgia position on mental disability case~. The Court recognizes that a
mental disability might be compensable if it results from accidental injury
that "may be so slight and repetitive that no one occasion by itself causes
che disabilitv, and holds that where the cumulative effect doe, so. the accident will be ~akcn a~ that point in time where disability results." Sawyer, id.
at 301, 233 S.E. 2d at 230. However, while the Court note\ that Georgia
does not allow recovery on the injury by accident grounds where job-related
anxietie~ produce nervou~ disability, still the Court ~uggests that long exposure to disability-producing conditions of employment can be treated on
the ground of occupations disease. Therefore, Sawyer lead~ to the conclusion that a "psychological or nervous injury due to long-term stress or other
job-related factors may be compensable as an occupational disease. • • :"'
In January, I 982, Judge Quillian returned another decision concerning
emotional disability. In Glynn County Board of Commissioners v. Mimbs,
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_ _ _ _ G a. App. _ _ _ _, #62899, dee. January 27, 1982, the clai' mant sought compensation for disability diagnosed as inogenous depression
and anxiety neurosis caused by job related emotional stress. T he claimant
, had been employed by the Glynn County Police Department before seeking
retirement because of his anxiety and depression. The Court affirmed the
administrative law judge•~ finding that the claimant failed to meet the requirements of Code Ann. §I 14-803(5), because he had failed to prove that
1he disease was "not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public
is exposed ," but remanded the cases for determination as to whether the
claimant suffered a disability compensable under the "injury by accident"
1heory under Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 114-4.
The lastest decision regarding the compensability of emotional disa1 bility is Hanson Buick Inc. v. Chatham, _ _ _ _ Ga. App. _ _ __
#63801, dee. June 16, 1982. The Court granted appeal to determine whether
mental disabilit; without prior physical injury was compensable under
Code Ann. § I 14-102 as an injury by accident. The Court decided that it was
not compemable.
In Hanson Buick, Inc., the claimant had a history of psychiatric disturbances dating back to World War II. He wa, employed by Hanson Buick in
1973, a nd wa~ discharged for poor performance in 1979. Within days of his
discharge, he became disabled from psychotic problems. There was no
physical injury which precipitated his mental breakdown. The stimuli for
the disability were exclusively psychological or emotional.
The Court "specifically and expressly denied compensation for psychic
trauma precipitated by psychic stimulus . . . . " It acknowledged Larson's
finding that a majority of jurisdictions supported compensation, but found
that such a position ran contra to clear public policy in Georgia. Judge Birdsong, writing for the Court. found that to allow compensation for psychological disability arising out of purely psychological injury could hamstring
employers from disciplining or firing employees for fear of stimulating
1ome emotional injury. Likewise, employers v.ould be extremely hesistant
to hire persons with psychological disorder~. Therefore, to comply with the
beneficent objectives of Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act, and to enrnurage fair employment opportunities for all persons including those who
are emotionally handicapped, the Court refused to require the employer to
compemate the claimant who could show no physical injury to have caused
the mental disability.
In conclusion, a number of jurisdictions are awarding compensation in
the emotional stimuli-to-emotional disability .:ase5. Georgia has refused to
join these states, holding that emotional disability must have some physical
stimulus to be compensable. The flood of potential claims from disgruntled
employees who have been chewed o ut by their bosses is stem med, at least
for the time being. It remains for Georgia's Legislat ure to amend the
Workers' Compensation Act to a llo " meritorious emotional d isability cases
to be compensated in the absence of physical inj ury.
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